In the last post (found here), I argued that a Realist interpretation of Romans 5:12 was the dominant position of the Reformed theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries. Not only did I provide statements from such men as Ursinus, Olevianus, Pareus, and others—all of whom followed Augustine—I showed that their interpretation was codified in the Reformed catechisms and confessions of the Reformation period (e.g. WSC 16; FCH 10-11).
In this post, I want to argue that the alternative position is not only inferior but problematic from a moral standpoint. If you remember, the Federalist, or better Representative interpretation of Romans 5:12 is that all men were punished with death not because they sinned in Adam but only because he had sinned in their place. In other words, by virtue of the federal and representative nature of the Covenant, all men were punished for a crime they did not commit. My thesis? This is not the Reformed Position.
The Attraction of the Representative View
Charles Hodge, arguably the most influential proponent of the representative position, writes:
// The only possible way in which all men can be said to have sinned in Adam, is putatively. His act, for some good and proper reason, was regarded as their act, just as the act of an agent is regarded as the act of his principal, or the act of a representative as that of his constituents. The act of the one legally binds the others // [1]
Again, Hodge writes:
// In the imputation of Adam’s sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of Christ’s righteousness to believers, the nature of imputation is the same, so that the one case illustrates the others. By virtue of the union between Adam and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people // [2]
The reason this interpretation is so attractive is that it presents the so-called parallel between Adam and Christ in a clear, clean, and symmetrical way. Note that Hodge says that the ground of our condemnation in Adam is “precisely” the same as the ground of our justification in Christ. For Hodge, both unions are representative so that the nature of the respective imputations is exactly “the same.”
The Assumption of Representative View
While such a construct is attractive, it is not without textual and theological problems, the first of which is that it is both unnecessary and unsupported by the text. In fact, hundreds of years before Hodge was born, Reformed theologians were already showing that Paul's purpose in Romans 5:12ff was a lot more modest than he would later suppose. Francis Turretin, the great Italian theologian of the 17th century, argued that whatever parallel does exist between Adam and Christ—it is minimal and must not be pushed too far. Contrary to Hodge, then, Turretin argues that the two respective imputations from Adam and from Christ are grounded upon two different kinds of union. He writes:
// If Adam constituted us unrighteous effectively by a propagation of inherent depravity (on account of which we are also exposed to death in the sight of God), it does not follow equally that Christ constitutes us righteous by a forensic justification at the bar of God by inherent righteousness given to us by him. The design of the apostle (which alone is to be regarded) does not have this direction. He only wishes to disclose the foundation of the connection between being exposed to death and the right to life, from our union with the first and second Adam, as to the thing (although the mode is different on account of the difference in the subject) // [3]
What Turretin says here is worthy of elucidation, for though he cannot be classified as a full Augustinian Realist, his comments are helpful in showing that a pure representative view is even less of an option. What the Federalist wants us to believe is that once we say our condemnation in Adam was based on natural union, we are thereby forced to say that our justification in Christ is based on the same. But here, Turretin argues that such a conclusion lacks the force of logic. This observation alone seems to neutralize the inference that Hodge wants to make and relegates his interpretation to realm of gratuitous assumption:
// If Adam constituted us unrighteous effectively by a propagation of inherent depravity, it does not follow equally that Christ constitutes us righteous by inherent righteousness //
The second thing he points out is that the most we can derive from the text itself is that our standing before God is based on whatever unions we sustain to the first and second Adams. But that's about all we can say for sure. For Turretin, we must be satisfied with that which is taught in the rest of Scripture namely, that the two unions are of a different nature or “mode.”
// He only wishes to disclose the foundation of the connection between being exposed to death and the right to life, from our union with the first and second Adam, as to the thing, although the mode is different on account of the difference in the subject // [4]
The Assessment of the Representative View
In getting started, Turretin is quite helpful. But as we move on from here, we should also note that those who force the parallel between Adam and Christ too far commit much more than a logical fallacy. On a much more serious level, they compromise God’s Righteousness as revealed in the Word of God by conflating the clear biblical distinction between free and just rewards.
In the Anthropology section of his Dogmatic Theology, William Shedd addresses this very issue. In doing so, he gives the following, and dare I say devastating critique:
// Those who make the imputation of Adam’s sin precisely like that of Christ’s righteousness commit the great error of supposing that sin, like righteousness, may be imputed to man in two ways: meritoriously and un-meritoriously, or gratuitously. This is contrary both to Scripture and reason. St. Paul teaches that righteousness may be imputed either κατὰ ὀφείλημα or κατὰ χάριν = δωρεάν = χωρὶς ἔργων (Rom. 3:21, 24, 28; 4:3–6). He asserts that righteousness may be placed to a man’s account either deservedly or undeservedly, either when he has obeyed or when he has not obeyed: “To him that works is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that works not, but believes on him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness” (4:4–5).
// But St. Paul nowhere teaches the same thing respecting sin. He never says that sin may be put to a man’s account either deservedly or undeservedly, either when he has sinned or when he has not sinned. His doctrine is that of Scripture, uniformly that sin is always imputed to man and angel κατὰ ὀφείλημα, never δωρεάν, never χωρὶς ἔργων, never undeservedly and gratuitously. The punishment of man’s disobedience he denominates “wages” but the reward of his obedience he denominates a “gift” (6:23). Christ’s obedience, which is the same thing as “the righteousness of God” (1:17; 9:3), can be a gift to his people; but Adam’s disobedience cannot be a gift to his posterity. Heaven can be bestowed upon the sinner for nothing that he has done; but hell cannot be // [5]
Shedd’s argument is persuasive because he shows that the error of the representative view proceeds on the false assumption that God sustains precisely the same relation to judgment as he does to salvation. But this is manifestly untrue. Not only is such a notion a violation of the intuitive moral principles of men (Rom. 2:14-15), it also runs contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptural data. In Genesis 4:7, God reminded Cain of the most fundamental moral principle there is—namely, that God never punishes those who do good: “If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?” Likewise, in Genesis 18:25, Abraham appeals to the same principle in his plea for the righteous of to be spared in the destruction of Sodom: “Far be it from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, far be it from thee! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?”
Other passages could be put forward here, but Abraham’s plea is especially important. I would venture to say that if today’s run-of-the-mill-theologian came across that statement, he would shoot it down with a measure of contempt and pride. How can we ask God if He will do “that which is right?” Doesn’t that question put God under a higher, outside law that He must now obey? Well, no, not really. All it does is recognize that God is always consistent with the moral principles of His Law. The reason for that is that His Law is a reflection of His moral perfection.
So in the end, Abraham was right to speak the way that he did. He was right to believe that God’s Righteousness prevented Him from treating the righteous the same as the wicked. And herein lies the problem with the representative view: If God punished Adam’s posterity for a sin they did not commit, then, in effect, God has condemned the righteous with the wicked.
If I may venture again, it seems as if the problem is almost entirely lost upon the vast majority of “Calvinists” today. Rather than seeing that this position introduces serious and unnecessary problems, they double down and defend their view by asking the ridiculous question posed in Ezekiel 18:19: “Why should the son not bear the guilt of the father?”
In this section, I want to show why it was that the earlier Reformed theologians never adopted a representative model. The reason is that they believed the only just grounds upon which a man could be punished for a crime is that he was somehow responsible for the crime itself. To borrow the common terminology of the 16th and 17th centuries, we would say punishment (poena) and culpability (culpa) are always inseparable—except in the unique case of Jesus Christ, who suffered for sins that he did not commit.
During the 16th century, Roman Catholic theologians were saying that, beyond the case of Christ, the separation of punishment (poena) from culpability (culpa) could justly apply to the ordinary ethical situations of the common man. According to William Shedd, this Tridentine separation was used to support their doctrine of penance. “They contended that although the sacrifice of Christ had freed the believer from the culpability of original sin, it had not freed him altogether from its punishment, and therefore he was still bound, more or less, by the reatus poenae (obligation to punishment) and must therefore do penance.” [6]
In response to this invented distinction, Turretin pushed back in his Institutes (9.3.5-6). He wrote:
// Falsely, however, is guilt distinguished by the papists into guilt of culpability and of punishment. The guilt of culpability (reatus culpae) according to them is that by which the sinner is of himself unworthy of the grace of God and worthy of his wrath and condemnation; but the guilt of punishment (reatus poenae) is that by which he is subject to condemnation and obliged to it. The former guilt, they say, is taken away by Christ. The latter, however, can remain (at least as to the guilt of temporal punishment). But the emptiness of the distinction appears from the nature of both. Since culpability and punishment are related and guilt is nothing else than the obligation to punishment arising from culpability, they mutually posit and remove each other so that culpability and its guilt being removed, the punishment itself ought to be taken away necessarily (as it can be inflicted only on account of culpability). Otherwise culpability cannot be said to be remitted or its guilt taken away, if there still remains something to be purged from the sinner because of it // [7]
If that last paragraph was confusing, just note that Turretin says:
(1) Any obligation to punishment must spring from culpability: “Guilt is nothing else than the obligation to punishment arising from culpability,” and again, “[punishment] can be inflicted only on account of culpability.”
(2) These two must stand or fall together because you cannot have one without the other: “They mutually posit and remove each other so that culpability and its guilt being removed, the punishment itself ought to be taken away necessarily.”
The point that Turretin is making here should be clear. Except in the unique case of Jesus Christ, no man can justly suffer the punishment for a crime that he did not commit. As we’ll see, the case of Original Sin was no exception to the rule. In fact, another notable theologian who disputed this Roman Catholic distinction (even when it was used by other evangelicals) was John Owen. In his treatise entitled, Arminianism (ch. 7), he wrote:
// Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by His mercy, pardoning the one and so not inflicting the other, are yet never so separated by His justice, inflicting the latter where the former is not. Sin imputed, by itself alone, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any but Christ // [8]
Apparently, the Arminians utilized this separation to sidestep the Realist interpretation of the Fall. Later in the eighteenth century, Jonathan Edwards is also seen confronting the Arminian pastor, John Taylor, whose interpretation of Romans 5:12 argued that ἥμαρτον (sinned) should be taken in the passive sense. [9] Like Hodge, Taylor proposed that Adam’s posterity did not sin in him, but were merely regarded to have sinned. As such, they were punishable but not properly guilty. In his treatise, On Original Sin (2.4.1), Edwards effectively dismantles this claim:
// No instance is produced wherein the verb “sin” which is used by the apostle, when he says “all have sinned,” is anywhere used in our author’s sense for “being brought into a state of suffering” and that not as a punishment for sin. St. Paul very often speaks of “condemnation,” but where does he express it “by being made sinners?” Especially how far is he from using such a phrase to signify being condemned without guilt or any imputation or supposition of guilt? Vastly more still is it remote from his language so to use the word sin and to say man “sins” or “has sinned,” though hereby meaning nothing more nor less than that he by a judicial act is condemned //
Calvin & Augustine
It should be noted that men like Turretin, Owen, and Edwards were not nearsighted. Their opposition to the separation of punishment from culpability was not a reaction merely to Roman Catholic aberrations, though it certainly was that. As one searches deeper into the annals of Church history, he will see that these men were saying nothing different from what Calvin had said before.
In his Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin said that although all men are liable for Adam’s first transgression, “This is not liability for another’s fault.” In the same section (2.1.8), he provides a fuller explanation, saying, “When it is said that the sin of Adam has made us obnoxious to the justice of God, the meaning is not, that we, who are in ourselves innocent and blameless, are bearing his guilt… For there could be no punishment without culpability.” [10]
In the end, it should also be said that Calvin was not unique in the convictions that gave shape to his own position. Rather, these biblical and moral convictions are found with equal force in the great Augustine himself. And while it’s true that Augustine’s theological opponents were quite different from those of our Reformed fathers, the point is nevertheless true. Like our fathers, Augustine knew the Scriptures and understood well the difference between the mercy we have in Christ and the justice we have in Adam. For this reason, it seems fitting to end this installment with a quotation from his work entitled: Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (4.6):
// But how can the Pelagians say ‘that only death passed upon us by Adam’s means?’ For if we die because he died, but he died because he sinned, they say that the punishment passed without the guilt and that innocent infants are punished with an unjust penalty by deriving death without the desert of death. This the catholic faith has known only of the one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus //
