Marriage and Parental Consent

All God-ordained authority is necessarily limited by two factors: (1) The revealed will of God in Scripture, and (2) The jurisdictional boundaries of the office in view. This means: (1) If the command or prohibition issued by an authority transgresses the Word of God, it must be disobeyed, and (2) If the command or prohibition issued lies outside the proper jurisdiction of the office in view, it may be disobeyed. These principles hold true for each of the three God-ordained governments of Family, Church, and State, and therefore to the offices of father, pastor, and magistrate alike.

What follows is but a brief study of the extent and limitation of the authority of fathers with regard to the marriage of their daughters, in particular, The goal is to identify the boundaries of parental jurisdiction when it comes to the question of whether they marry this man, that man, or no man at all. As a primary rule, we will consult the Scriptures and, whenever possible, rely upon the wisdom, insight, and experience of our Protestant forefathers.

Criteria for Lawful Marriage

Seeing that Marriage is a creation ordinance (Gen. 2:18, 24), a particular marriage cannot be automatically judged invalid or unlawful simply because the persons to be married are not Christians. However, because in general Scripture indicates that it is necessary for a man to “provide” for his wife and household (1 Tim. 5:8; Matt. 7:9), we must conclude that any man who is not in a position to fulfill this duty is ineligible for marriage. Yet when one of the persons to be married is a Christian, a new criterion arises: the other must be a Christian also. Scripture makes this rule explicit when it says: “Do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers” (1 Cor. 6:14), and confirms it when it says, in the case of a widow: “If her husband dies, she is at liberty to be married to whom she wishes, only in the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:39)

Since the Scriptures are clear about what constitutes a lawful marriage, we should, first of all, conclude that it cannot be within the jurisdiction of any man to either: (1) Prohibit a lawful marriage, or (2) Consent to an unlawful marriage. This is stated in the Westminster Larger Catechism (Q. 139), where it says that the sins forbidden in the 7th Commandment include: “the prohibiting of lawful, and dispensing with unlawful marriages.”  

The Westminster Directory for the Publick Worship of God says that without “a just cause” parents are bound to give their consent to the marriage of their children: “Parents ought not to force their children to marry without their free consent, nor deny their own consent without just cause.” To see what the Divines may have had in mind by the phrase “just cause” we can look to the Westminster Confession (24.3):

It is lawful for all sorts of people to marry who are able with judgment to give their consent. Yet it is the duty of Christians to marry only in the Lord. And, therefore, such as profess the true reformed religion should not marry with infidels, Papists, or other idolaters: neither should such as are godly be unequally yoked, by marrying with such as are notoriously wicked in their life, or maintain damnable heresies.

According to the Confession, it is a just cause to withhold one’s consent to any marriage that would join the “godly” to the “wicked.” This is not a prohibition against joining two Christians who are at different places in the progress of their sanctification, as can be seen by the prooftexts the Divines used to support this article. In every case, the text describes the union between those who belong to the true religion and those who do not.

Genesis 34:14, “And they said to them, We cannot do this thing, to give our sister to one who is uncircumcised, for that would be a reproach to us.”

Exodus 34:12-16, “Take heed to yourself, lest you make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land where you are going, lest it be a snare in your midst. But you shall destroy their altars, break their sacred pillars, and cut down their wooden images, for you shall worship no other god; for the LORD, whose name is Jealous, is a jealous God, lest you make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they play the harlot with their gods and make sacrifice to their gods, and one of them invites you and you eat of his sacrifice, and you take of his daughters for your sons, and his daughters play the harlot with their gods and make your sons play the harlot with their gods.”  

2 Corinthians 6:14-15, “Do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers. For what fellowship has righteousness with unrighteousness? And what accord has Christ with Belial? Or what part has a believer with an unbeliever?”

Deuteronomy 7:3-4, “Nor shall you make marriages with them. You shall not give your daughter to their son, nor take their daughter for your son. For they will turn your sons away from following me, to serve other gods; so the anger of the LORD will be aroused against you and destroy you suddenly.”

1 Kings 11:4, “For it was so, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned his heart after other gods; and his heart was not loyal to the LORD his God, as was the heart of his father David.”

Nehemiah 13:25-27, “So I contended with them and cursed them, struck some of them and pulled out their hair, and made them swear by God, saying, You shall not give your daughters as wives to their sons, nor take their daughters for your sons or yourselves. Did not Solomon king of Israel sin by these things? Yet among many nations there was no king like him, who was beloved of his God; and God made him king over all Israel. Nevertheless, pagan women caused even him to sin. Should we then hear of your doing all this great evil, transgressing against our God by marrying pagan women?”

Malachi 2:11, “Judah has dealt treacherously, and an abomination has been committed in Israel and in Jerusalem, for Judah has profaned the LORD’s holy institution which He loves: He has married the daughter of a foreign god.”

Again, the Divines are not under the impression that the Bible prohibits marriage between one Christian and another, even if they enjoy different levels of sanctification. The most we can gather from their teaching is that a father should not give his daughter to a man who is either an unbeliever or is so "notoriously wicked" that any profession of faith he might make must be called into question. Such a man is not eligible to marry a Christian woman, and vice versa.

Extent of Parental Authority 

Some people believe and teach that a father has the “final say” about the marriage of his daughter and is not accountable to anyone for his decision. But this seems to be an indefensible claim since such a position is lacking clear biblical support. While it might be said that a father’s role and responsibility are indispensable and that his word ought to carry significant weight in the decision-making process, it is not entirely clear from Scripture that he has an unappealable authority. The concept of an absolute veto power is nowhere to be found.

The most common passage that is used to support such an idea is found in Numbers 30, where it says that a father has the power to cancel his daughter's vow if he does not approve of her decision. It is rarely acknowledged, however, that there are two points of criteria the daughter must meet in order for this passage to apply: she must be “in her father's house” (v. 3b) and must be “in her youth” (v. 3c). Though Moses does not identify the age range for what constitutes a person’s youth, it was commonly understood among the Rabbis to begin at age twelve or thirteen. Jamieson, Fausset, and Brown write: “According to Jewish writers… the age at which young people were deemed capable of vowing was thirteen for boys and twelve for girls.”

However, the question that needs to be answered is: When (if ever) does the time of a person’s youth expire? Are we to assume that a woman continues in a state of perpetual childhood so long as she remains unmarried? According to John Calvin, she does not. In his comments on 1 Corinthians 7:36, where Paul tellingly refers to a woman who is “past the flower of her youth,” Calvin indicates that the Christian theologians of his time had no such concept of “perpetual childhood.” Instead, they taught that this stage of a person’s life expires at the age of twenty. He writes: “By this clause, the flower of her youth, he means the marriageable age; this, lawyers define to be from twelve to twenty years old.” With this qualification in mind, we might argue that the law of Numbers 30 has real but limited application to the question at hand. The vow of a young woman who is (1) still in her father’s house, and (2) still in the stage of her youth, that is, anywhere between twelve and twenty years old, can still be overruled by her father.

In any case, it can be admitted that the passage itself speaks in broad generalities. But it should be emphasized that basing a doctrine or practice on the generality of a single text is unwise. Generalities are not always universal, and certainly not absolute. Thus before we decide on the application of a general rule to a particular situation, we must be sure that we: (1) have not overlooked relevant, restricting details in the rule itself (e.g., the phrase "in her youth"), and (2) will not undermine the details of further revelation on the same subject. This brings us to the point that must be reckoned with—namely: Other passages of Scripture speak to the matter of parental consent, and they do not use or presuppose such an application of Numbers 30. One of those passages is found in 1 Corinthians 7.

Apostolic Criteria for Withholding Marriage

In 1 Corinthians 7, Paul gives instructions to fathers about giving their daughters in marriage. What seems obvious is that if Numbers 30 serves as a "blank check," so to speak, granting fathers full and final authority in this matter, the instructions Paul provides in this chapter are out of place. All he would need to say is that, according to God's law the marriage of any young woman depends on the will of her father. But Paul doesn't say that. Instead, he ends up saying things that make such an application of Numbers 30 even more untenable than it already is. 

There are two things about Paul's instruction in 1 Corinthians 7 that deserve our attention. The first is the context. As we read the passage, we get the sense that, apart from rare cases of having the special gift of continency (v. 7), the only reason Paul was encouraging any individual to entertain the possibility of not pursuing a lawful marriage is that the world was in a state of upheaval and instability at that time. He writes: "Now concerning virgins: I have no commandment from the Lord, yet I give judgment as one whom the Lord in His mercy has made trustworthy. I suppose therefore that this is good—because of the present distress—that it is good for a man to remain as he is. Are you loosed from a wife? Do not seek a wife. But even if you do marry, you have not sinned; and if a virgin marries, she has not sinned. Nevertheless such will have trouble in the flesh, but I would spare you. But this I say, brethren, the time is short" (vv. 26-29).

Most commentators believe Paul's reference to the present distress, the trouble in the flesh, and the fact that the time was short was about the impending Jewish-Roman war. Because he knew that war, pestilence, and famine would soon fill the land (cf. 1 Cor. 10:11), he thought it was wiser for those who were unmarried to remain in a single state. As Jesus predicted in Matthew 24:19, 21: “Woe to those who are pregnant and to those who are nursing babies in those days! For then there will be great tribulation, such as has not been since the beginning of the world until this time, no, nor ever shall be.” In any case, one should notice that, even during such a tumultuous time as this, Paul put clear limitations on his advice. He recognized that because there was no divine law that prohibited a virgin from marrying in such a situation, the decision was not his to make. Paul says: “I have no command from the Lord.” 

The other thing we should notice is more directly related to the question of a father's consent. We read in verses 36-38: "If any man thinks he is behaving improperly toward his virgin, if she is past the flower of youth, and need so require, let him do what he wills, he does not sin: let them marry. Nevertheless, he who stands steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but has power of his own will, and has so determined in his heart that he will keep his virgin, does well. So then he who gives her in marriage does well, but he who does not give her in marriage does better."

In this passage, Paul is speaking to the fathers who were worried they might be sinning against their daughters by keeping them from marriage. Clearly, they were inclined to take Paul's advice, even though he admitted that his own preference was not the final word. A father would naturally want to know: How can I know for sure that I am not sinning against my daughter? So to comfort the fathers in this predicament, Paul assures them they would not be sinning so long as a few important points of criteria were met. 

Again—it may be helpful here to remember that none of these criteria has to do with the particular man that a young woman had in view. So long as she desired to marry a believer (1 Cor. 6:14), and so long as he was in a position to provide for her needs (1 Tim. 5:8; Matt. 7:9), her desire was lawful in the eyes of God. This discussion is about a unique and temporary situation that would soon bring untold hardship to the whole of their society. That particular hardship, viz., “the present distress,” would make a new marriage and a young family extremely difficult to sustain. It was this consideration only that allowed for the possibility that a father might keep his daughter from pursuing a lawful marriage. I repeat this here so that I might exhort the reader: Let us not so quickly attempt to press this text into the service of our own situation. That would be to stretch the word beyond the scope of its intended application.

That said, Paul provides fathers with two things they need to know: 

1.  First, a father is not sinning by withholding his daughter from marriage only if he has power of his own will.

What does it mean for a person to have “power of his own will?” Simply put, it means that no one else's will is opposing his decision. In this case, the opposition would refer to the will of his daughter who desires to be married. The implication is arresting. Paul believes that even during the present distress, a father would be sinning if he simply, and on the basis of his own authority, overpowered his daughter's will. So long as the marriage in view was lawful in the eyes of God, the father is expected to give his blessing to the marriage. 

Matthew Poole confirms this when he explains that a father having “power of his own will” (v. 37) means that “his will is not contradicted by his daughter's fondness of a married life; for in such a case the father, though he would not willingly dispose of his daughter in marriage, yet he ought to be overruled by the will of the daughter.” He then says: “For though the parent hath a great power over his child, and ought to consent to the marriage of his child, yet he hath no power as to wholly hinder them from marriage.”

This is not the only place where Poole speaks to this issue. In his comments on Jeremiah 35:19 he raises the question about parental consent and asks whether parents have the final say in the marriage of their children. He argues that they do not. For Poole, marriage is a "natural liberty” that belongs to the individual by virtue of his or her creation. In other words, marriage is a creation ordinance that precedes the authority of the family. It is not a privilege that originates with the family, and therefore it cannot be taken away by the family apart from clear direction of the Creator. God alone has given this gift to mankind, and he alone has the right to determine its lawful and unlawful uses. As long as individuals are pursuing that which is lawful according to the word of God, fathers are expected to give these individuals their blessing and support. Poole writes:

This brings in another question: Whether parents have a power to oblige their children in matters which God hath left at liberty. Unquestionably, parents do not have a power to determine children in all things as to which God hath left them at liberty, for then they have a power to make their children slaves and to take away all their natural liberty. To marry or not, and to this or that person, is a matter of liberty. Therefore, parents cannot in this case determine their children. Parents being set over children, and instead of God to them, as it is their duty to advise their children to the best of their ability for their good; so it is the duty of children to receive their advice, and not to depart from it, unless they see circumstances so mistaken by their parents, or so altered by the providence of God, that they can reasonably conclude that, had their parents known or foreseen it, they would not have so advised. But that parents have an absolute power to determine children in all things as to which God hath not forbidden them, and that children by the law of God are obliged to an obedience to all such commands, even when they may see that their parents are mistaken, or that God by his providence has altered circumstances, I see no reason to conclude.

2.  Second, a father is not sinning by withholding his daughter from marriage only if there is no necessity that requires it.

There is an interesting phrase in verse 37 that describes a situation where there is no “necessity” for marriage. It would seem that this implies the opposite—namely, that sometimes there is a necessity for marriage. The question becomes: What might that necessity be? 

Some commentators think this is the father's necessity, referring to his need to give his daughter away to alleviate the financial burden connected with her care. Others say the necessity belongs to the daughter and refers to the limited time of her child-bearing capacity. While the second explanation has a bit more support than the first, viz., the phrase “needs so require” appears next to the statement about her “passing of the flower of her youth,” there is a third explanation that seems preferable: The necessity Paul is talking about belongs to the whole situation: First, to the daughter because of her need for intimate relations, and then to the father because of his responsibility to protect his daughter from the sin of fornication. Concerning the phrase, “needs so require,” Calvin writes: “In this clause, I understand him as referring to the girl’s infirmity—in the event of her not having the gift of continency; for in that case, necessity constrains her to marry.”

This interpretation has the benefit of keeping one of the major themes of the context in view. In this reading, Paul is reminding us that every individual person has a different measure of resistibility when it comes to sexual temptation. His warning to the father, then, is that he needs to consider whether his daughter has a propensity to run incautiously into relationships with the opposite sex. If she does, then according to Paul, marriage is a necessity.

Again, this is a theme that pervades the previous context, and Paul addresses it with great boldness and pastoral wisdom. In verses 8-9, he speaks to unmarried individuals about their desire for sexual intimacy: “I say to the unmarried and to the widows: It is good for them if they remain even as I am; but if they cannot exercise self-control, let them marry. For it is better to marry than to burn with passion.” The same instruction was given in the opening section (vv 1-3). To ensure that those with an unmanageable desire for such relations were provided for—and to ensure that those who were weak would avoid sin—Paul prescribes marriage. From his perspective, marriage is the best way to prevent a needy individual from engaging in sexual immorality: "It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, because of sexual immorality, let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband" (v. 1).

What are the implications here? One implication is that every father has to face the real possibility that by pulling his daughter back from marriage he might end up sling-shooting her right into an unlawful relationship. Like the snapping of a rubber band, he can end up causing her to shoot forward and fall headlong into sin. So this requires a man to know his daughter extremely well. He needs to ask himself: Does my daughter have a propensity in this direction? Does she demonstrate a lack of self-control in this area? Paul says that he has to consider all of these things before he can conclude—even in view of her outward submission to his will—that he is doing the right thing. “For if power be wanting on the part of the daughter,” writes Calvin, “the father acts an exceedingly bad part by endeavoring to keep her back from marriage, and would be no longer a father to her, but a cruel tyrant.” 

Poole takes the same approach. In his comments on verse 36, he argues that the necessity for marriage arises from a situation where the father “sees reason to fear that, if he does not give her in marriage, she will so dispose of herself without asking her father's advice, or be exposed, possibly, to worse temptations.” Then, picking up on Paul’s remedy for this situation, which is to simply “Let them marry,” he says: 

The apostle, in his former discourse, had nowhere condemned a married estate during the present distress, as being sinful or unlawful, but only as inexpedient, or not so expedient as a single life during the present distress. He had before determined in verse 9 that it was "better to marry than to burn." Therefore, no inexpediency of a thing can balance what is plainly sinful. If therefore the case be such that a man or woman must marry, or sin, though marriage brings with it more care and trouble, yet it is to be preferred before plain sinning.

From all this, it becomes clear that there are several determining factors in the marriage of a young woman and they cannot be reduced to a single thing. There are many considerations and each has its own place. While the element of parental consent is a blessing and certainly ideal, it is not left to parents to act according to their own preferences. Even fathers have limited authority over the decisions of their daughters, and according to Scripture, one of those decisions is about whether they marry this man, that man, or no man at all. As we’ve seen, this is especially true in situations where the young woman either “cannot exercise self-control” (1 Cor. 7:9) or is “passing the flower of her age” (v. 36) and strongly desires to marry. When a young Christian woman wants to marry another Christian man, and that man is qualified in every biblical way, there is no argument her father can put forth against it that carries the force of the law. It may have the ring of wisdom, but not the force of law. 

Martin Luther sums it up well when he writes:

It is quite certain therefore that parental authority is strictly limited; it does not extend to the point where it should wreak damage and destruction to the child, especially to its soul. If then a father forces his child into a marriage without love, he oversteps and exceeds his authority. He ceases to be a father and becomes a tyrant who uses his authority not for building up—which is why God gave it to him—but for destroying. He is taking authority into his own hands without God, indeed, against God. The same principle holds good when a father hinders his child's marriage, or lets the child go ahead on his own, without any intention of helping him in the matter. In such a case the child is truly free and may act as if his parent or guardian were dead; mindful of what is best for himself, he may become engaged in God's name, and look after himself as best he can.1

In one of his letters of spiritual counsel, Luther writes to a man who was refusing to give his blessing to his daughter. But because he could see no biblical basis for denying the lawfulness of the marriage, he set out to correct the man, even threatening him with the power of his pastoral office. In his mind, the family is not a sovereign, independent government, but is ever coexisting with other God-ordained governments (the state and the church), and that for its own good. In God's wisdom, he knows that the family needs accountability. Moreover, this implies that the individual members of each government have the right to appeal to the officers of the other two when they believe they are being treated unjustly. Equally important—it is always the responsibility of the officers of any government to hear concerns and complaints that are being brought to their attention. As officers under Christ, it is their duty to intercede and act with a righteous use of their own power if necessary. Luther writes:

As I have written before, children should not become engaged without parental consent. But at the same time, I also wrote that parents should not and cannot rightly compel or prevent their children to please themselves. In short, I pray you not to delay your consent any longer. Let the good fellow have peace of mind. And I cannot wait much longer. I shall have to act as my office requires.2  


End Notes:

1. Martin Luther, That Parents Should Neither Compel Nor Hinder the Marriage of Their Children, And That Children Should Not Become Engaged Without Their Parents' Consent (1524)

2. Martin Luther: Letters of Spiritual Counsel—Letter dated June 4, 1539

This idea of governmental intervention deserves a fuller treatment than I can give here. For now, I will leave the reader with a few resources for further consideration:

On page 73 of The Register of the Company of Pastors of Geneva in the Time of CalvinPhilip Edgecombe Hughes writes: 

In the case of children who marry without the consent of father or mother at the age when they are permitted to do so (stated as being ages 20 for a man and 18 for a woman on the previous page), as above, if it is known to the court that they have acted lawfully while their fathers have been negligent or excessively strict, the fathers shall be compelled to assign them a dowry or to grant them such a portion and position as would have been the case had they consented to the marriage. 

On pages 366-367 of his History of the Church of Scotland (1655), John Spottiswood writes:

Public inhibitions should be made, that no persons under the power and obedience of fathers, tutors, and curators, either men or women, contract marriage privately, and without the knowledge of those to whom they live subject, under the power of church censure; for if any son or daughter be moved towards a match, they are obliged to ask the counsel and assistance of their parents for performing the same. And though the father, notwithstanding their desires, has no other cause than the common sort men have, to wit, lack of money, or because they are not perhaps of a lineage and birth as they require; yet must not the parties make any covenant till the ministry or civil magistrate be acquainted therewith, and interpone their request for the parent's consent; which if they cannot obtain, finding no just cause why their marriage ought not to proceed, in that case, they, sustaining the place of the parent, may consent to the parties, and admit them to marry, for the work of God ought not to be hindered by the corrupt affections of worldly men. 

Baptismal Efficacy: A Catechetical Presentation, Pt. 3

Questions on Baptismal Efficacy

3. You have now said that Baptism puts us in a “real covenant relationship with Jesus Christ,” but what exactly does that mean?

I use the term “covenant” to emphasize the objective nature of our relationship with Christ, and the term “real” to guard against the notion that Baptism initiates a hypothetical reality.

In other words, I would argue that the relationship between Jesus and his baptized people is just as “real” as the relationship between a man and his wedded wife, or between a father and his adopted son. In fact, I would say that Baptism puts us in a relationship analogous to both.

QUESTION: If it’s true that Baptism puts us in a “marital relationship” with Jesus Christ, where do we see such a connection in Scripture?

ANSWER: This connection can be seen in several ways in Scripture, but especially in the descriptions of the relationship between God and His people in the old and new testaments. Here's how that works:

  • (1) In the Old Testament, the relationship between God and Israel is described as a marriage (Jer. 3:14), and in the New Testament, the relationship between Christ and the Church is described in the same way (2 Cor. 11:2).

  • (2) In the Old Testament this relationship was formally established by circumcision as the sign of the covenant (Jn. 7:22), and in the New Testament Baptism takes the place of circumcision (Col. 2:11-12).

  • (3) Therefore, just as circumcision did before: Baptism now puts us in a marriage relationship with Jesus Christ.

QUESTION: Can you show this connection by something other than the process of good and necessary consequence?

ANSWER: Absolutely. In the New Testament, John the Baptist and the Apostle Paul made this connection rather directly.[1]

  • (1) When John’s disciples complained that Jesus was “baptizing” more disciples than he was (Jn. 3:22-29), John responded with an allusion to marriage. He said: “He that hath the bride is the bridegroom.”

  • (2) When Paul described Jesus as the “husband” of the Church (Eph. 5:25-27), he made an allusion to Baptism. He said: “Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ also loved the church and gave Himself for her, that He might sanctify and cleanse her with the washing of water by the word.”[2]

What we have in these two passages is very instructive—namely, two references, making the same connection, but coming from opposite directions: John was in a context of Baptism and made a direct reference to marriage, and Paul was in a context of marriage and made a direct reference to Baptism. It's clear, then, that the two concepts are intertwined.

QUESTION: Is there any danger involved in using this marriage analogy?

ANSWER: The only danger we need to avoid is confusing of objective and subjective categories, as I mentioned under Question #1. However, if we maintain those categories, there is nothing to fear, and we can affirm both of the following propositions:

  • (1) Like the wedding ceremony, the baptismal ceremony initiates a covenant relationship, and does so in a real and objective manner.

So just as no one walks away from a wedding wondering whether or not the ceremony actually “worked,” so no one should walk away from a Baptism wondering the same. For, just as the minister declares: "I now pronounce you Man and Wife" and it always works, so the minister declares: "I now baptize you into the Name of the Father, the Son, and of the Holy Spirit" and it, too, always works. This is because, more than marriage, Baptism is a God-ordained ritual act that formally changes our relationships.[3]

  • (2) Like the wedding ceremony, the baptismal ceremony has no power to effect the inward, subjective change of a person's heart.

So just as two people can be united in marriage either with or without true love in their hearts, so also can a person be united to Christ in Baptism with or without true faith. For, just as a wedding ceremony—though it initiates a real change of status and identity—is unable to produce the love that's necessary for a healthy marriage, so the baptismal ceremony also has no power to produce the faith that’s necessary for eternal salvation.

Rather, in both cases, we must affirm that the only power that can ever bring about the necessary subjective change in a person’s heart and life comes from the Holy Spirit alone.[4]


Notes:

[1] According to the ancient custom, a Jewish woman always prepared for the wedding ceremony by an act of ritual cleansing, commonly called “the mikvah.” It would seem then, that both John and Paul were alluding to that practice in their “marital” descriptions of Baptism.

[2] The standard Reformed interpretation of Ephesians 5:26 is that “the washing of water” refers to the sacrament of Baptism.

[3] I use the phrase “more than marriage" on purpose. As a Reformed Christian, I reject the notion that marriage is a sacrament. According to Scripture, there are only two sacraments: Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

[4] This is not to say that God does not and cannot use Baptism as a means by which he works a subjective change in the hearts of His elect. God is sovereign and can do whatsoever He pleases. Rather, I make this statement as one who affirms WCF 28:6.

Baptismal Efficacy: A Catechetical Presentation, Pt. 2

2. Since the sacraments are effectual “only when received in faith,” does that mean Baptism does nothing for the person who does not believe?

Actually, I never said: Faith is necessary for the sacraments to be effectual. What I said was: Faith is necessary for the sacraments to be effectual “unto salvation.” That’s an important difference.

Every time a person is baptized he receives something from God—and that "something" is always good, and always beneficial—even if the person does not believe. In fact, we can see that by what Paul said about circumcision, which was the Old Testament equivalent to Baptism.

After telling his readers that being circumcised in the flesh was no guarantee of a circumcised heart (Rom. 2:28-29), he anticipated their objection: “What advantage then hath the Jew? Or what profit is there in circumcision?" Paul’s answer is unambiguous. He says: “Much in every way!” (Rom. 3:1-2).

In context, this means if a man was circumcised and perished in the end, he only had himself to blame. No one could say that God had failed to provide him with everything he needed to be saved. To say such a thing would imply that God was the “unfaithful” party in their relationship. And of course, that would be a slanderous lie:

  • “For what if some did not believe? Will their unbelief make the faithfulness of God of none effect? Certainly not! Indeed, let God be true but every man a liar” (Rom. 3:3-4)!

I believe the same thing applies to Baptism. Those who are baptized profit “much in every way” even if they continue in unbelief. Objectively speaking, God has given them everything they need to be saved so that if they perish, they will only have themselves to blame.

This means that the sacraments are always effectual in one way or another. Since Baptism puts us in a real covenant relationship with Jesus Christ, it will either result in our salvation or the *increase of our judgment before God, for to whom much is given, much is required.[1] In either case, we cannot say that Baptism does nothing for those who do not believe.  


Notes:

[1] This is what we might call the principle of proportionality, and Jesus used it in Luke 12:48 to show why some men will receive greater punishment than others on the Day of Judgment (cf. Mt. 11:20-24; Heb. 10:22, 28-29).

Baptismal Efficacy: A Catechetical Presentation, Pt. 1

One of the things I keep hearing from friends and Facebook friends alike is, Paul, I’m confused about what you’re actually saying about Baptism.

The more I think about it, that can be an indication that in my recent attempts to articulate my position,[1] I haven’t been as clear as I’ve tried to be. Another possibility is that some of the things I’m saying are new and unfamiliar, and those who are trying to understand me simply lack the necessary theological categories to process my material. 

Whatever the case may be, I have a desire to make myself as clear as possible. As a pastor, it’s my job to make sure that my teaching is understood by all. True, I can’t make people agree with me, but if they go away disagreeing with what I’m not saying, I’ll be the only one to blame.  

In this series, I want to explain my position on Baptismal Efficacy as clearly and forthrightly as I can. To help with that, I'll be presenting this material in “catechetical” form. First, I will pose the most pressing and relevant questions, and then proceed to answer those questions to the best of my ability.

Questions About Baptismal Efficacy

1. You have said that the sacraments are “effectual means of salvation.” Where did you get that terminology from and what exactly does it mean?

I get this terminology directly from the Westminster Standards. In Question 91 of the Shorter Catechism, we read: “The sacraments become effectual means of salvation not from any virtue in them, or in him that doth administer them, but only by the blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit in them that by faith receive them.”

In order to grasp this, you have to know what it means to say that something is a “means of grace.” In simple terms, a means is a medium, instrument, or vehicle through which something is communicated. To be clear then, I affirm that God communicates the benefits of redemption to us through various appointed means, including the preaching of the word and the administration of the sacraments.[2]

It’s important to keep in mind, however, that in the sacraments (just like the word) God's grace is communicated in an objective manner. In order for it to become effectual unto salvation, the recipient must receive it by faith.

  • To state it concisely: Baptism is an objective means by which God communicates His grace, and Faith is the subjective means by which that grace is received. 

The basis for this position can be seen in two examples from Scripture. In Hebrews 4:2, we learn that much of the Exodus generation perished in the wilderness but not because God withheld His grace from the people (indeed they all heard the preaching of the word). Rather, the people perished because they didn’t receive it by faith: “The word preached did not profit them, not being mixed with faith in them that heard it.” 

The same thing can be seen with Baptism. When a baptized person fails to obtain salvation, the reason is not that God somehow withheld His grace. The problem is that the person did not receive what God had given him by the hand of faith. This is why Jesus said, “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned.” 

So, yes, I believe that in and through Baptism there is always a real and objective giving or communication of saving grace. But it is only when we receive it by faith that we can benefit from it in a saving way. This is what we might call the “objective-subjective paradigm,” or as other theologians might prefer, the “gift-reception paradigm” of Holy Baptism:

“In baptism, God offers, and we receive; God promises, and we believe; God acts, and we respond. God wraps up the gift of Christ in the means of grace; we receive and open the gift by faith.”[3]


Notes

[1] To get an idea of what I’ve been saying on this subject, see HERE for my article and HERE for the podcast interview about my article.

[2] Question 85 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism says: “To escape the wrath and curse of God due to us for sin, God requireth of us faith in Jesus Christ, repentance unto life, with the diligent use of all the outward means whereby Christ communicateth to us the benefits of redemption.” In Question 88, it says: “The outward and ordinary means whereby Christ communicates to us the benefits of redemption are his ordinances, especially the word, sacraments, and prayer; all which are made effectual to the elect for salvation.”

[3] Rich Lusk, Baptismal Efficacy and Baptismal Latency: A Sacramental Dialogue, found HERE. It is clear that Lusk is saying nothing different from what Calvin taught when he said: “From this sacrament, as from all others, we gain nothing, except insofar as we receive in faith.” John Calvin and Henry Beveridge, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: The Calvin Translation Society, 1845), 339.

In the Loins of Adam: A Realist Interpretation of the Adamic Covenant, Pt. 2

In the last post (found here), I argued that a Realist interpretation of Romans 5:12 was the dominant position of the Reformed theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries. Not only did I provide statements from such men as Ursinus, Olevianus, Pareus, and others—all of whom followed Augustine—I showed that their interpretation was codified in the Reformed catechisms and confessions of the Reformation period (e.g. WSC 16; FCH 10-11). 

In this post, I want to argue that the alternative position is not only inferior but problematic from a moral standpoint. If you remember, the Federalist, or better Representative interpretation of Romans 5:12 is that all men were punished with death not because they sinned in Adam but only because he had sinned in their place. In other words, by virtue of the federal and representative nature of the Covenant, all men were punished for a crime they did not commit. My thesis? This is not the Reformed Position.

The Attraction of the Representative View

Charles Hodge, arguably the most influential proponent of the representative position, writes: 

// The only possible way in which all men can be said to have sinned in Adam, is putatively. His act, for some good and proper reason, was regarded as their act, just as the act of an agent is regarded as the act of his principal, or the act of a representative as that of his constituents. The act of the one legally binds the others // [1]

Again, Hodge writes:

// In the imputation of Adam’s sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of Christ’s righteousness to believers, the nature of imputation is the same, so that the one case illustrates the others. By virtue of the union between Adam and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people // [2] 

The reason this interpretation is so attractive is that it presents the so-called parallel between Adam and Christ in a clear, clean, and symmetrical way. Note that Hodge says that the ground of our condemnation in Adam is “precisely” the same as the ground of our justification in Christ. For Hodge, both unions are representative so that the nature of the respective imputations is exactly “the same.”

The Assumption of Representative View

While such a construct is attractive, it is not without textual and theological problems, the first of which is that it is both unnecessary and unsupported by the text. In fact, hundreds of years before Hodge was born, Reformed theologians were already showing that Paul's purpose in Romans 5:12ff was a lot more modest than he would later suppose. Francis Turretin, the great Italian theologian of the 17th century, argued that whatever parallel does exist between Adam and Christ—it is minimal and must not be pushed too far. Contrary to Hodge, then, Turretin argues that the two respective imputations from Adam and from Christ are grounded upon two different kinds of union. He writes:    

// If Adam constituted us unrighteous effectively by a propagation of inherent depravity (on account of which we are also exposed to death in the sight of God), it does not follow equally that Christ constitutes us righteous by a forensic justification at the bar of God by inherent righteousness given to us by him. The design of the apostle (which alone is to be regarded) does not have this direction. He only wishes to disclose the foundation of the connection between being exposed to death and the right to life, from our union with the first and second Adam, as to the thing (although the mode is different on account of the difference in the subject) // [3]

What Turretin says here is worthy of elucidation, for though he cannot be classified as a full Augustinian Realist, his comments are helpful in showing that a pure representative view is even less of an option. What the Federalist wants us to believe is that once we say our condemnation in Adam was based on natural union, we are thereby forced to say that our justification in Christ is based on the same. But here, Turretin argues that such a conclusion lacks the force of logic. This observation alone seems to neutralize the inference that Hodge wants to make and relegates his interpretation to realm of gratuitous assumption:

// If Adam constituted us unrighteous effectively by a propagation of inherent depravity, it does not follow equally that Christ constitutes us righteous by inherent righteousness //

The second thing he points out is that the most we can derive from the text itself is that our standing before God is based on whatever unions we sustain to the first and second Adams. But that's about all we can say for sure. For Turretin, we must be satisfied with that which is taught in the rest of Scripture namely, that the two unions are of a different nature or “mode.”

// He only wishes to disclose the foundation of the connection between being exposed to death and the right to life, from our union with the first and second Adam, as to the thing, although the mode is different on account of the difference in the subject // [4] 

The Assessment of the Representative View

  • Representation Compromises God’s Revealed Righteousness

In getting started, Turretin is quite helpful. But as we move on from here, we should also note that those who force the parallel between Adam and Christ too far commit much more than a logical fallacy. On a much more serious level, they compromise God’s Righteousness as revealed in the Word of God by conflating the clear biblical distinction between free and just rewards.

In the Anthropology section of his Dogmatic Theology, William Shedd addresses this very issue. In doing so, he gives the following, and dare I say devastating critique:

// Those who make the imputation of Adam’s sin precisely like that of Christ’s righteousness commit the great error of supposing that sin, like righteousness, may be imputed to man in two ways: meritoriously and un-meritoriously, or gratuitously. This is contrary both to Scripture and reason. St. Paul teaches that righteousness may be imputed either κατὰ ὀφείλημα or κατὰ χάριν = δωρεάν = χωρὶς ἔργων (Rom. 3:21, 24, 28; 4:3–6). He asserts that righteousness may be placed to a man’s account either deservedly or undeservedly, either when he has obeyed or when he has not obeyed: “To him that works is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that works not, but believes on him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness” (4:4–5).

// But St. Paul nowhere teaches the same thing respecting sin. He never says that sin may be put to a man’s account either deservedly or undeservedly, either when he has sinned or when he has not sinned. His doctrine is that of Scripture, uniformly that sin is always imputed to man and angel κατὰ ὀφείλημα, never δωρεάν, never χωρὶς ἔργων, never undeservedly and gratuitously. The punishment of man’s disobedience he denominates “wages” but the reward of his obedience he denominates a “gift” (6:23). Christ’s obedience, which is the same thing as “the righteousness of God” (1:17; 9:3), can be a gift to his people; but Adam’s disobedience cannot be a gift to his posterity. Heaven can be bestowed upon the sinner for nothing that he has done; but hell cannot be // [5]

Shedd’s argument is persuasive because he shows that the error of the representative view proceeds on the false assumption that God sustains precisely the same relation to judgment as he does to salvation. But this is manifestly untrue. Not only is such a notion a violation of the intuitive moral principles of men (Rom. 2:14-15), it also runs contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptural data. In Genesis 4:7, God reminded Cain of the most fundamental moral principle there is—namely, that God never punishes those who do good: “If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?” Likewise, in Genesis 18:25, Abraham appeals to the same principle in his plea for the righteous of to be spared in the destruction of Sodom: “Far be it from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, far be it from thee! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?”

Other passages could be put forward here, but Abraham’s plea is especially important. I would venture to say that if today’s run-of-the-mill-theologian came across that statement, he would shoot it down with a measure of contempt and pride. How can we ask God if He will do “that which is right?” Doesn’t that question put God under a higher, outside law that He must now obey? Well, no, not really. All it does is recognize that God is always consistent with the moral principles of His Law. The reason for that is that His Law is a reflection of His moral perfection.

So in the end, Abraham was right to speak the way that he did. He was right to believe that God’s Righteousness prevented Him from treating the righteous the same as the wicked. And herein lies the problem with the representative view: If God punished Adam’s posterity for a sin they did not commit, then, in effect, God has condemned the righteous with the wicked. 

If I may venture again, it seems as if the problem is almost entirely lost upon the vast majority of “Calvinists” today. Rather than seeing that this position introduces serious and unnecessary problems, they double down and defend their view by asking the ridiculous question posed in Ezekiel 18:19: “Why should the son not bear the guilt of the father?”    

  • Representation Carries Roman Catholic & Arminian Baggage

In this section, I want to show why it was that the earlier Reformed theologians never adopted a representative model. The reason is that they believed the only just grounds upon which a man could be punished for a crime is that he was somehow responsible for the crime itself. To borrow the common terminology of the 16th and 17th centuries, we would say punishment (poena) and culpability (culpa) are always inseparable—except in the unique case of Jesus Christ, who suffered for sins that he did not commit. 

During the 16th century, Roman Catholic theologians were saying that, beyond the case of Christ, the separation of punishment (poena) from culpability (culpa) could justly apply to the ordinary ethical situations of the common man. According to William Shedd, this Tridentine separation was used to support their doctrine of penance. “They contended that although the sacrifice of Christ had freed the believer from the culpability of original sin, it had not freed him altogether from its punishment, and therefore he was still bound, more or less, by the reatus poenae (obligation to punishment) and must therefore do penance.” [6] 

In response to this invented distinction, Turretin pushed back in his Institutes (9.3.5-6). He wrote:

// Falsely, however, is guilt distinguished by the papists into guilt of culpability and of punishment. The guilt of culpability (reatus culpae) according to them is that by which the sinner is of himself unworthy of the grace of God and worthy of his wrath and condemnation; but the guilt of punishment (reatus poenae) is that by which he is subject to condemnation and obliged to it. The former guilt, they say, is taken away by Christ. The latter, however, can remain (at least as to the guilt of temporal punishment). But the emptiness of the distinction appears from the nature of both. Since culpability and punishment are related and guilt is nothing else than the obligation to punishment arising from culpability, they mutually posit and remove each other so that culpability and its guilt being removed, the punishment itself ought to be taken away necessarily (as it can be inflicted only on account of culpability). Otherwise culpability cannot be said to be remitted or its guilt taken away, if there still remains something to be purged from the sinner because of it // [7] 

If that last paragraph was confusing, just note that Turretin says:

(1) Any obligation to punishment must spring from culpability: “Guilt is nothing else than the obligation to punishment arising from culpability,” and again, “[punishment] can be inflicted only on account of culpability.”

(2) These two must stand or fall together because you cannot have one without the other: “They mutually posit and remove each other so that culpability and its guilt being removed, the punishment itself ought to be taken away necessarily.”

The point that Turretin is making here should be clear. Except in the unique case of Jesus Christ, no man can justly suffer the punishment for a crime that he did not commit. As we’ll see, the case of Original Sin was no exception to the rule. In fact, another notable theologian who disputed this Roman Catholic distinction (even when it was used by other evangelicals) was John Owen. In his treatise entitled, Arminianism (ch. 7), he wrote:

// Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by His mercy, pardoning the one and so not inflicting the other, are yet never so separated by His justice, inflicting the latter where the former is not. Sin imputed, by itself alone, without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any but Christ // [8]

Apparently, the Arminians utilized this separation to sidestep the Realist interpretation of the Fall. Later in the eighteenth century, Jonathan Edwards is also seen confronting the Arminian pastor, John Taylor, whose interpretation of Romans 5:12 argued that ἥμαρτον (sinned) should be taken in the passive sense. [9] Like Hodge, Taylor proposed that Adam’s posterity did not sin in him, but were merely regarded to have sinned. As such, they were punishable but not properly guilty. In his treatise, On Original Sin (2.4.1), Edwards effectively dismantles this claim:

// No instance is produced wherein the verb “sin” which is used by the apostle, when he says “all have sinned,” is anywhere used in our author’s sense for “being brought into a state of suffering” and that not as a punishment for sin. St. Paul very often speaks of “condemnation,” but where does he express it “by being made sinners?” Especially how far is he from using such a phrase to signify being condemned without guilt or any imputation or supposition of guilt? Vastly more still is it remote from his language so to use the word sin and to say man “sins” or “has sinned,” though hereby meaning nothing more nor less than that he by a judicial act is condemned //

Calvin & Augustine

It should be noted that men like Turretin, Owen, and Edwards were not nearsighted. Their opposition to the separation of punishment from culpability was not a reaction merely to Roman Catholic aberrations, though it certainly was that. As one searches deeper into the annals of Church history, he will see that these men were saying nothing different from what Calvin had said before.

In his Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin said that although all men are liable for Adam’s first transgression, “This is not liability for another’s fault.” In the same section (2.1.8), he provides a fuller explanation, saying, “When it is said that the sin of Adam has made us obnoxious to the justice of God, the meaning is not, that we, who are in ourselves innocent and blameless, are bearing his guilt… For there could be no punishment without culpability.” [10]

In the end, it should also be said that Calvin was not unique in the convictions that gave shape to his own position. Rather, these biblical and moral convictions are found with equal force in the great Augustine himself. And while it’s true that Augustine’s theological opponents were quite different from those of our Reformed fathers, the point is nevertheless true. Like our fathers, Augustine knew the Scriptures and understood well the difference between the mercy we have in Christ and the justice we have in Adam. For this reason, it seems fitting to end this installment with a quotation from his work entitled: Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (4.6):

// But how can the Pelagians say ‘that only death passed upon us by Adam’s means?’ For if we die because he died, but he died because he sinned, they say that the punishment passed without the guilt and that innocent infants are punished with an unjust penalty by deriving death without the desert of death. This the catholic faith has known only of the one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus //


Endnotes:

[1] Charles Hodge, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 5:12

[2] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 1997), 194-195.

[3] Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, vol. 2 (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1992–1997), 644.

[4] For good measure, we should note that in the following section of his Institutes (16.3.15), Turetin once again marks the difference in the kind of union sustained between Adam and his posterity and Christ and his people. “Nor does it follow that if we are constituted unrighteous and obligated to punishment by the sin propagated from Adam, we ought, therefore, to be justified by the righteousness inherent in us by the regeneration communicated by Christ because the reason (ratio) of each is most diverse. And, moreover, Paul here (Rom. 5:18–19) instituted a comparison between the first and second Adam, in respect to the fact [of union], but not in respect to the manner of the fact (in re, non in modo rei).”

[5] William Greenough Thayer Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, ed. Alan W. Gomes, 3rd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Pub., 2003), 463. 

[6] Shedd, Theology, 458–459.

[7] Turretin, Institutes, 595

[8] John Owen, The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold, vol. 10 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, n.d.), 74–75.

[9] Shedd, Theology, 460.

[10] John Calvin and Henry Beveridge, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: The Calvin Translation Society, 1845), 292–293